Pakistan Election Primer

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April 24, 2013: Pakistanis are scheduled to go to the polls on May 11 to choose members of the country’s National Assembly and its four provincial Legislative Assemblies. We offer a handy primer on the election – and why and how it matters. The bottom line: despite pre-election violence from Islamic extremists, chances are this election will eventually produce a viable government. If mass public protests occur after the election, that would be the clearest indication of a more troublesome prognosis.

Why is this Pakistan election different from all other Pakistan elections?

This is a historic event for Pakistan. For the first time since independence in 1947 the country will be choosing a new National Assembly to replace another that was elected in a free and fair vote and completed its five-year term.

Who’s being elected?

At stake are 342 seats in the National Assembly and over 700 in the Legislative Assemblies of Punjab, Sindh, Khyber-Pakhtunhwa, and Balochistan. At the national level, voters will elect 272 members on a first-past-the post basis. The 70 remaining seats – 60 reserved for women and ten for non-Muslim minorities – are allocated to political parties on the basis of their showing in the contests for the directly-elected seats.

Who’s not being elected?

Asif Ali Zardari’s five-year presidential term continues until September. Whether he runs again will depend on how the political wind blows after May 11. The president is chosen indirectly by an electoral college comprising members of the National Assembly, the Senate (the upper house of the Pakistan Parliament), and the provincial Legislative Assemblies.

No Senate seats are up for election this year. The next election, for one-third of the Senate, will take place in 2014.

Who’s running the election?

A caretaker government, chosen under complicated provisions to ensure neutrality and responsible only for conducting the election. Headed by Mir Hazar Khan Khoso, an 84-year old retired chief justice of the Balochistan High Court, it comprises mostly technocrats and other non-political types and is forbidden to make major policy decisions before the elected political government takes over. Similar arrangements are in place at the provincial level. A neutral Election Commission runs the election on the ground. Large numbers of American and other international observers are expected to be on hand. The Army will help provide security for the balloting but will not otherwise have an official role.

Even with such arrangements, will the election really be free and fair?

There’s a good likelihood that the elections will be properly run in most parts of Pakistan. International observers have generally found earlier elections administered by interim governments free and fair, though there have been some important exceptions. What’s troubling this time is violence by Islamic extremists against parties they consider unacceptably secular. In Khyber-Pakhtunwha (formerly the North-West Frontier Province), the provincially-based, secular Awami National Party has been particularly targeted. Another contentious issue has been the insistence by some Election Commission officials that candidates prove they meet Islamic credentials required by the constitution but rarely enforced before. This has produced an outcry and appeals to the courts by more liberal contenders whose nomination papers had been rejected.

If President Zardari remains in office, won’t that tip the balance toward the PPP?

Not really. During Zardari’s tenure the Pakistan constitution was amended to shift power to the prime minister and away from the president. He remains a powerful figure but will have no role in the interim administration and has not to date taken part in the election campaign. He recently resigned as PPP co-chairman under pressure from the judiciary, which held that the president of Pakistan was expected to be impartial.

Who are the major contenders?

As in 2008 and repeatedly in the 1990s, the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) and the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) are the chief contenders.

Who will win?

Most pundits daring enough to predict election results expect the PML-N to win the most seats, but believe that it will require the support of some of the smaller parties to form a stable government.  Impartial polling data also suggests this outcome. Another possible but less likely outcome: a coalition headed by a smaller party, with support of one of the big parties.

What should we know about the PML-N?

The PML-N (for Nawaz) emerged as the second largest party in the 2008 election, when it won 91 National Assembly seats to the PPP’s 124.  It is a family-dominated party led by Nawaz Sharif, the scion of a Lahore business clan who was twice prime minister in the 1990s. Its power base is in Punjab, Pakistan’s largest, wealthiest, and most politically influential province. Nawaz’s younger brother Shahbaz was chief minister of the province for five years before he gave way to a pre-election caretaker regime in March. Ideologically, the PML-N is considered right-of-center. It has generally followed pragmatic economic policies.  Like most Pakistanis, PML-N leaders mistrust the United States. But they have not made anti-Americanism a significant feature of their campaign, which in any event is focused on domestic issues. The party has had political ties with non-terrorist Islamic groups: each has sought to use the other for its own purposes. Its overriding political interest since it left a PPP-led coalition government in Islamabad in 2009 is to return to national power. Although Nawaz’s last government was overthrown in an army coup, he should be able to work out a modus vivendi with the military if he returns to power.

Why is the PML-N seemingly in the lead?

Anti-incumbency sentiment runs high. The PPP government is bitterly criticized for its inability to deal effectively with rampant inflation, severe power shortages, pervasive violence, and other pressing economic and social problems. Many Pakistanis see Zardari as corrupt and incompetent. By comparison, Nawaz and the PML-N now look good, though his performance when he held national power was mediocre at best.

Can the United States work with a Nawaz Sharif government?

Yes. In the 1990s, the George H.W. Bush and Clinton administrations maintained decent working relations with his government. He was not held in high esteem in Washington, especially when he rejected U.S. pleas not to test a nuclear weapon and acquiesced in the Pakistan army’s invasion of the Kargil area of Indian-administered Kashmir. Unless he is saddled with coalition allies powerful enough to insist that he reject any significant relationship with Washington, expect Nawaz to seek friendly if limited bilateral ties.

What about the PPP?

Don’t count the PPP out. Zardari is recognized even by his critics as a shrewd political operator. He has access to plenty of cash, and he knows where a lot of bodies are buried. And Pakistani pundits and pollsters have been wrong before.

What kind of party is it?

The PPP has a broader national political base than any other serious contender. It is represented in all four provinces of Pakistan, including Punjab, the Sharifs’ native heath.  Its strongest bastion is in rural Sindh, the home of the Bhutto-Zardari family that has dominated the party since Zardari’s father-in-law, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, founded it in the 1960s and brought it to national power in the 1970s.

Zardari remains the PPP standard-bearer, although he is not running for office in the May election. If they win, he will appoint the party’s ministers and participate in key policy and personnel decisions. Bilawal Bhutto-Zardari, the son of Zardari and his assassinated wife Benazir Bhutto, is too young to run for parliament this year, but is being groomed to follow in his parents’ footsteps.

What will the PPP do if it wins again?

Expect continuity, taking into account changes in the international political landscape. The biggest change, of course, will be the withdrawal of NATO troops from Afghanistan and the reappraisal of U.S. interests in Pakistan that will accompany it. Like other political parties that have ruled Pakistan, the PPP will defer to the Army on major foreign and security issues. Whether Zardari and the prime minister he chooses will be able to pursue their interest in mildly improved relations with India will depend as much on developments in New Delhi as on Pakistani politics.

Aside from the Big Two, who else is contesting the election?

Pakistani election documents list 148 political parties, ranging from major national parties to individual or feudal franchises. Two of the most prominent parties have ethnic bases. The Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) represents Urdu-speakers in urban Sindh whose families emigrated from India to Pakistan, and the Awami National Party (ANP) is supported by Pashtuns in northwestern Pakistan and the Pashtun diaspora in big cities, especially Karachi. Both the MQM and the ANP have joined PPP-led coalitions and have led or participated in national and provincial governments. Both are strongly secular and have incurred the wrath of Islamic fundamentalists.

What about cricketer-hero Imran Khan?

Imran’s Pakistan Tehrik-i-Insaf (PTI) has never won more than one seat in the National Assembly. His cricket star power has helped him emerge as a crowd-pleasing populist politician, who promises the kind of genuine change in Pakistani politics that the established parties cannot credibly offer. His greatest appeal appears to be to young, urban Punjabis, but a good number of prominent and respected people have also recently joined his ranks. What is still not clear is whether he can tap into the feudal patronage system that drives Pakistani politics. Unlike other secular party leaders, Imran has made criticism of the United States a major plank in his platform, promising to rid Pakistan of American “slavery” if he comes to power. There are periodic reports that he is considering some kind of understanding with the largest Islamic party, the Jamaat-i-Islami.

PTI cannot hope to challenge the PML-N or the PPP in number of seats won. But it could pick up enough of them to make Imran a kingmaker.

What is the role of ex-President Musharraf?

Little or none. Musharraf’s hopes of rallying support for a return to power were dashed after his homecoming in February. The Election Commission disqualified him from running for the National Assembly. The Supreme Court ordered his arrest, and he has been charged with crimes committed during his nine years in office. He is currently detained in his villa outside Islamabad (now designated a “sub-jail”). His detention generated no protest. His political party has a minimal presence, and politicians who worked with him have shown no interest in re-connecting. The army appears to consider him an embarrassment. Conceivably, he may believe that post-election chaos would lead the country to turn to him, or he may be eyeing a run for President in September. So far, both seem unlikely.

What about Islamic fundamentalist parties?

Their electoral high water mark was in 2002, when they gained 11 percent of the vote. The parties are divided, both by the style of Islam they preach and by their provincial identities. Several are potential partners in a governing coalition (with either of the major parties, based on their track record). The Islamic parties should not be confused with the Pakistani Taliban, an insurgent movement prepared to use violence against the state. The Taliban condemn the election and are implicated in pre-election violence.

Will the army intervene?

Probably not, barring a major breakdown in public order. At this writing, army leaders prefer to work behind the scenes, and hope the constitutional process will yield a government they can work with.

What does this all mean?

Keep your expectations realistic. Forming a coalition may take a while (over a month in 2008). The leader will probably be a familiar and flawed figure, who will need to govern with one eye on the army. Relations with Washington will remain strained by diverging strategic objectives and deep mutual suspicions. Major policy decisions will still be hard to reach. Economic pressures will still weigh, especially on Pakistan’s cities.

But a decently held election, with manageable levels of violence, will be an important step toward stabilizing Pakistan’s system of civilian government. No one – probably not even Imran Khan – wants to explode relations with the United States, and even the army is searching for a better way to manage ties with India.

What would be indications of post-election trouble?

The key indicator of a darker prognosis would be mass street protests after the election, which could affect the army’s actions. Other developments that could badly stress the system include attacks on Pakistani security forces or senior government figures by the Afghan or Pakistani Taliban, or a “terrorist spectacular” in India traceable to Pakistan.

Howard and Teresita Schaffer

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