Dealing with Pakistan: Conflicting Views

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July 22, 2011: It has been almost three months since a U.S. SEAL task force killed Osama bin Laden at his Abbottabad hideaway, gravely aggravating the worst crisis in U.S.-Pakistan relations since 9/11.  Since the raid, there has been a continuing flurry of diplomatic activity as officials of the two countries sought to deal with immediate issues and to establish the “operating rules” for fruitful bilateral relations.

As the negotiations drag on and the crisis period lengthens, important differences of view remain in Washington about how to proceed.  Key senior officials in the intelligence and security relationship have visited in both directions. The U.S. government has taken some important decisions, notably the suspension of about one-third of planned U.S. security assistance. They coupled this with a strong defense of the administration’s economic aid plans.  But Washington policymakers are still grappling for a way to deal with Pakistan that fosters U.S. interests in South Asia and will be acceptable to the U.S. Congress and to Pakistani leaders grown increasingly mistrustful of the United States.

Similar differences of view on how to proceed are evident among U.S. South Asian specialists outside the government. We find three broad views among them about what to do.

    • A “third divorce:” The most extreme school of thought posits that the close U.S.-Pakistan political and security relationship established following 9/11 is no longer sustainable or worth pursuing. Proponents point to significant differences between U.S. and Pakistani strategic objectives in Afghanistan and the deep, widespread, and apparently growing animosity toward the United States among Pakistani military and civilian leaders and the public. They regard the attitudes of both the top generals and the rank and file of the Pakistan Army as particularly problematic and dangerous. The army, in this view, is unlikely to recover from the “three humiliations” it has suffered at American hands: the Abbottabad raid; the Raymond Davis affair, which revealed that the United States had intelligence operations in Pakistan that it had not disclosed to the Pakistan government; and the revelation in Wikileaks documents that while they were expressing public outrage about drone attacks on Pakistani targets, Pakistan’s military leaders were privately assuring American officials that they had no objection to them.

Some proponents of a hard line argue for refocusing the U.S. relationship to Pakistan on economic and social assistance as provided for in the Kerry-Lugar legislation. If security assistance is continued at all, they argue, it should be drastically reduced. This approach would represent a “third divorce” between the United States and Pakistan, though unlike the previous divorces in 1965 and 1990 it would keep civilian assistance programs in place.

    • Pursue modest and concrete cooperation: A second group of analysts believe that cooperation is possible, but that the broad, all-encompassing strategic partnership both countries have talked about for the past decade is out of reach. They favor an approach that focuses on more specific and, they would say, more realistic areas where the two countries can work together . In the past, when prospects for robust strategic ties seemed more promising, this approach would have been excoriated as a “transactional relationship” that would fail to overcome the “trust deficit” created by the rocky history of bilateral ties.

Those who favor this more modest approach focus on a few contentious issues that are most important for American interests. These include dealing with the remaining al-Qaeda operatives in Pakistan, U.S. use of drones against Pakistani targets, the role of Pakistan (and India) in Afghanistan peace negotiations, and the ground rules for the CIA-ISI relationship. In this view, even if agreement can be found only on some of these issues, the approach is worth pursuing because of Pakistan’s importance to the United States as a large, strategically placed, nuclear-armed Muslim country without whose cooperation American objectives in Afghanistan would be impossible to attain.

    • Keep working toward strategic partnership: The third school of thought holds that only a close and trusting relationship will put the United States in a position to help Pakistan strengthen itself internally and secure the kind of results the United States needs in Afghanistan. They believe that this must be the goal once the worst immediate problems are resolved. They continue to decry the concept of a “transactional” relationship. But they are a diminishing number amid their gloomier colleagues.

There appears to be widespread conviction among U.S. Pakistan watchers that the administration’s recent decision to drastically reduce military assistance is likely to make matters worse. Although it stops well short of the complete aid ban that characterized the two previous “divorces” in 1965 and 1990, it will only annoy Pakistanis and be seen by the army as a further humiliation. The administration’s assertion that Pakistan’s refusal to grant visas to U.S. trainers made the reduction necessary has strong operational logic, but has not erased the sting of the decision. For Pakistanis, the move is another example of the unfaithfulness and heavy hand they believe typifies the way Washington has historically dealt with them.

We believe that the middle ground – working toward a more modest and specific cooperative agenda – is the soundest. The issues mentioned above would be at the core of this effort. The objective would be to achieve some easily understood and readily observable milestones for both sides. Until progress is made in this direction the relationship will remain in a dangerous state.

The United States should work primarily through private and unpublicized meetings with Pakistani leaders, including the army generals who call the shots on foreign and security policies, but also the civilian leadership. Treating Pakistan with respect should not involve buying into its efforts to put all the blame for dysfunction on the United States, however. Public comment on the relationship the relationship should be infrequent. When a public statement is required, it should focus on the importance of creating a mutually beneficial basis for cooperation, without making unrealistic and disingenuous claims of strategic harmony. It is also probably a good time for senior officials to “stay in their lane,” avoiding public comment on issues outside their jurisdiction. Remarks such as those by Admiral Mullen about the role of ISI in the death of a Pakistani journalist, while accurate and well-meaning, can only further roil already troubled waters.

At the same time, we should encourage a broad discussion by U.S. officials about Pakistan’s important role in the effort to bring about a settlement in Afghanistan. In this connection, we found Secretary Clinton’s remarks in her speech at Chennai particularly useful. She sensibly used that occasion to call attention to Pakistan’s important role in the effort to bring about settlement in Afghanistan, called for India to recognize this, and welcomed India’s own role there.

Howard and Teresita Schaffer

4 Replies to “Dealing with Pakistan: Conflicting Views”

  1. It will be interesting to learn from the writer as to what are the real benifits accrue to the United states by maintaining relationship with the Pakistan.

    The state is anti liberal non democratic and openly supports extreamists whu are killing US servicemen/ women in Afghanistan. Its activities in Afghanistan are clearly anti US. So why are the authors suggesting a continued engagement with the state of Pakistan. When that state by its actions and associations has clearly demonstrated that it is an implacable foe of the US.

    Is it because the continued existance of the state of Pakistan is expected to excersise a check on India?

  2. All the three approaches, while eminently suitable in dealing with other nation-states, may not apply to Pakistan because they miss a fundamental fact. Pakistan’s sole aim is to deal with India either on an equal or superior footing. Such a desire goes back to declaring themselves to be the legatee of the Mughal rulers whose empire spread over vast stretches of the then India for several centuries. Pakistan has used many ruses to achieve this unattainable goal. Even rulers of princely states, such as Hyderabad or Bhopal, well entrenched within the Indian dominion were enticed by Pakistan to accede to them at the time of Partition. An undecided Jammu & Kashmir was the largest of all princely states and its geographical location straddling both the newly independent countries offered an attractive opportunity for Pakistan to grab it by force. Ever since then, Pakistan’s foreign and even domestic policies have been shaped only by its India obsession. Whether it was SEATO or CENTO or the Mutual Defence Agreement with Pres. Eisenhower, they were all entered into only with the India-calculus in mind. The Cold War offered Pakistan a tool to implement its India-desire. Later, the Afghan jihad provided a similar opportunity. Pakistan is wary of the fickle mindedness of a superpower and therefore prefers a ‘transactional relationship’ with the US. It therefore knows that a divorce can happen anytime. Therefore, it tries to make hay while the sun shines. A case in point is how Pakistan acquired nuclear weapons during the Afghan jihad period. Whenever the geo-strategic policies of the US clashed with this single Pakistani obsession, the US-Pakistani marriage ended in a divorce. It was never a divorce in the true sense as the two erstwhile partners continued to maintain contacts. As authors of the book on Pakistan’s negotiating strategies and tactics, the Schaffers must know quite well that one tactic of Pakistan is to make the US feel guilty for its own wrongdoings and obsession. While top Generals and leaders subscribe to the Mughal mindset, the Islamist parties, their foot soldiers and the jihadi tanzeems subscribe to the Caliphate mindset. The former is limited to the region while the latter is limitless. It is this division of approach that is the root cause of terrorism within Pakistan today. The US has to disabuse Pakistan of both these mindsets if it wants to have a sustained and strategic relationship because anything else will fail. So, rather than starting with the premise that one of the three approaches outlined here will work, the question needs to be asked as to what must be done to wean Pakistan away from this self-destructive and all consuming jihadi mindset. That is the only sure shot way to stabilize the region and contain terrorism radiating from this country and lay a solid foundation for the US-Pakistan relationship.

  3. I am dismayed at the unreasonable anti-Pakistan talk I hear from all sides, often coupled with anti-Muslim expressions. Your suggestions are so sensible that they may be ignored. “We have to show those terrorists they can’t push us around.”

  4. All I can add is that Pakistan has been negotiating very successfully with the United States and getting what it wants, which is money and weapons, with a gun held to its own head.
    Hence, the best way for the United States to deal with Pakistan, which is ruled by its military with a civilian facade as the front men, is to apply the scissors. In other words, graduate the money and arms to ensure normal, non-aberrant behavior. Given its financial difficulties that will not go away very soon, Washington may yet be willing to get real, but I am not sure that it will.

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