South Asia Hand

An article by Teresita C. Schaffer on the halted nuclear deal between the United States and India.

Closer relations with the United States have been a fact of life for a decade and are a centerpiece of India’s post–Cold War foreign policy, supported by virtually all major political parties. The bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement (“123 Agreement”) that India and the United States announced on July 27, 2007, was a move toward implementing their civilian nuclear deal and was greeted with jubilation inside both governments. Surveys suggested that it was also popular with ordinary Indians. Political opposition, however, soon arose in India.

The killer objections came from the leftist parties, part of the parliamentary majority but not formally part of the Indian government. The ideological leadership of the Communist Party of India–Marxist (CPM), the largest party within the left, has not been part of this consensus, sounding the alarm bells about the danger of India’s foreign policy becoming subservient to that of the United States. “Strategic autonomy,” perhaps the most emotive foreign policy issue in India, has wide political resonance.

Originally published October 31, 2007 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Critical Questions. Read the entire article.

An article by Teresita C. Schaffer on India’s decision to put the U.S.-India Civilian Nuclear Agreement on hold.

The bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement (“123 Agreement”) India and the United States announced July 27, 2007 was a move towards implementing their civilian nuclear deal, and was greeted with jubilation inside both governments. Surveys suggested that it was popular with ordinary Indians. But it faced political explosions in India. Of the three Indian groups that had expressed concerns about the deal, one, the nuclear establishment, pronounced itself satisfied with the 123 Agreement. The other two went into rising choruses of opposition. The opposition Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which many believe would happily have accepted the same deal had it been in power, objected on grounds that it might place restrictions on India’s nuclear arsenal.

Originally published in the Center for Strategic & International Studies‘ South Asia Monitor on October 26, 2007. Read the entire article.

An article by Teresita C. Schaffer and Pramit Mitra on the implications of the U.S.-India Civilian Nuclear Agreement.

After a jubilant visit by President George W. Bush to Delhi and stops in Pakistan and Afghanistan, the spotlight has turned to Capitol Hill. Legislation to amend the 1954 U.S. Atomic Energy Act to allow the president to go ahead with the recently concluded U.S.-India Civilian Nuclear Agreement was introduced in both houses of Congress on March 16, 2006. Administration officials are optimistic that it will pass, though they recognize that this will take hard work and the process will be complicated. If the Bush administration succeeds, however, the agreement could provide a major boost to U.S.-India bilateral relations and change the priorities and operation of the nonproliferation regime.

Originally published in the Center for Strategic & International Studies‘ South Asia Monitor on April 3, 2006. Read the entire article.